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Comments
DISCRETION AND THE FAA: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION OF THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT TO FAA ACTIVITY
BRIAN BLAKELEY
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act'(FTCA or Act), which was acknowledged as "a general
waiver of governmental immunity in tort, limited only by
enumerated exceptions."2 One of the exceptions enumerated
in the Act is that the federal government may not be held
liable for the performance or the failure to perform a discre-
tionary function.' One district court has stated that decisions
interpreting the discretionary function exception "do not
comprise a particularly coherent body of case law."'4 Corn-
I The Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat. 842 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-2402, 2411-2412,
2671-2680 (1976)). For a discussion of the special problems involved in bringing an
action against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see Silverman, The
Ins and Outs of Filing a Claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 41
(1979)).
2 Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO.
L.J. 81, 82 (1968) quoting Comment, The Federal Tort Clains Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 536
(1947).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1172 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that a
motion to dismiss by the United States be denied where plaintiff's allegations that the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration had negligently inspected the prem-
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mentators generally have not been so kind: one has referred
to the discretionary function exception as a "monstrous joker
now threatening to engulf the entire Act in a twilight zone."'
The confusion which in general surrounds the discretionary
function exception has not been avoided by courts that have
ruled on its scope and application in cases where the liability
of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for negligent
conduct is at issue.6
After a review of the relevant background material,7 this
comment analyzes cases involving the FAA and the discre-
tionary function exception and attempts to clarify the types
of FAA activity that courts are likely to find to be discretion-
ary.' Typically, cases in which the FAA has been alleged to
have been negligent and in which the discretionary function
exception may be relevant fall into three broad categories.
First, the FAA has been sued several times for alleged negli-
gence in producing aeronautical charts.9 Next, a significant
number of cases involve the alleged negligent acts of air traf-
fic controllers."0 Finally, a great number of recent cases dis-
cuss the potential of FAA liability for the negligent inspection
and certification of aircraft."' After an analysis of cases from
ises of a private employer would permit development of facts that would avoid a bar
by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act).
' Stromswold, The Twilight Zone of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 4 AM. U. L. REV. 41,
42 (1955). For more recent views on general applications of the discretionary function
exeption, see Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act." Discretionaqy Function Exception
Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L.REv. 161 (1976); Reynolds, supra note 2; Zillman, The Chang-
ing Meanings of Discretion: Evolution in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 76 MIL. L. REV. 1
(1977); Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception and the Suits in Admiralty Act. A Safe
Harbor for Negligence?, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 385 (1981); Comment, Federal Tort
Claims: A Critique of the Planning Level - Operational Level Test, 11 U.S.F. L. REV. 170
(1976).
Ii Compare Allnutt v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (FAA failure
to depict power lines on an aeronautical chart held to be within the scope of the discre-
tionary function exception) with Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir.
1980) (publication of an aeronautical chart which erroneously depicted the location of
a television tower held not to be within the scope of the discretionary function excep-
tion). See inra notes 83-93and accompanying text.
See in/ta notes 13-77 and accompanying text.
See iqa notes 78-220 and accompanying text.
See in/ra notes 78-116 and accompanying text.
See in/ta notes 117-155 and accompanying text.
See in/ta notes 156-220 and accompanying text. FAA tort cases which do not fall
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each of these three areas, this comment concludes with the
suggestion of a more rational approach to the application of
the discretionary function exception.12
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a sovereign
government cannot be sued by one of its subjects unless it
consents to the suit. 3 The doctrine is based upon the English
maxim "the king can do no wrong."' 4 In 1793, the Supreme
Court rejected the doctrine as inconsistent with the theory of
conveniently into these categories and which are not elsewhere discussed in this com-
ment include United States v. Lockheed, 656 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding the
FAA not liable for the conversion of a plane seized for failure to adhere to safety regu-
lations); Federal Ins. Co. v. United States, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,103 (D. Ka. 1978)
(holding the FAA liable for negligently failing to maintain an airstrip); Starr v. United
States, 393 F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (holding that the FAA was not liable for
failing to prevent trespassers at a local airport). Federal Tort Claims Act cases involv-
ing military aviation include Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (holding that the
FTCA precludes a finding of liability against the United States for sonic boom damage
on a theory of strict liability); Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1973)
(reversing the dismissal of a claim against the United States for sonic boom damage);
Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding the Air Force
liable for the wrongful death of a civilian test pilot caused by a design defect in an
ejection seat); Abraham v. United States, 465 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding an Air
Force decision of where to route aircraft causing sonic boom damage to be within the
scope of the discretionary function exception); United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d
379 (9th Cir. 1964),cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964) (holding the United States liable
for the mid-air collision of an Air Force training jet and an airliner); Dahlstrom v.
United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956) (holding that unauthorized activity in a
government aircraft is not within the scope of the discretionary function exception).
See generally Annot., 47 A.L.R. FED. 85 (1980); Brydges & Fagan, The Federal Tort Claims
Act As It Relates to Aviation Accidents, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 244 (1981); Tigert & Honigberg,
Defend4g the Government in Aviation Accident Cases, 15 FORuM 224 (1981).
2 e inra notes 221-239 and accompanying text.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 970-71 (4th ed. 1971). For an
in-depth analysis of the historical origins of governmental immunity, see Edwin
Borchard's exhaustive eight-part study that appeared between 1924 and 1928 in the
Yale and Columbia law reviews: Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1,
129, 229 (1924), Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039
(1926), Borchard, Governmental Responsibiti in Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 577, 734
(1928).
,, W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 970. Borchard wrote that the phrase "the King can
do no wrong," although long misunderstood, was originally intended to convey the
idea that the King could do no wrong with impunity. Borchard,supra note 13 in 34 YALE
LJ. 1, 2 n.2.
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a nation founded on popular sovereignty. 5 In 1824, however,
the Court reversed itself on this issue and held that the
United States government could not be sued without its con-
sent.16 The Court gave no justification for the adoption of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity 7 and it was not until 1868
that Justice Miller wrote that the doctrine was necessary to
avoid involving the government in "endless embarassments,
and difficulties, and losses which would be subversive of the
public interests."' 18 What came to be the modern justification
for the doctrine was not expressed by the Court until 1907,
when Justice Holmes stated that "[a] sovereign is exempt
from suit. . . on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends."' 9
Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act with the
two-fold purpose of mitigating the harshness of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity 2° and relieving itself of the burden of
dealing with the thousands of private claims bills that were
annually being submitted to Congress.2' Under the Act, the
United States is liable for the negligent or wrongful acts of its
employees in the same manner that a private person would
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 338 (1824). Three years
earlier the Court had stated in dicta that the United States could not be sued without
the consent of the federal government. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 357, 385
(1821).
17 W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 971. Prosser wrote that "[j]ust how this feudal and
monarchistic doctrine ever got itself translated into the law of the new and belliger-
ently democratic republic in America is today a bit hard to understand." Id Borchard
wrote that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was introduced to America "without
sufficient understanding" and survived "mainly by reason of its antiquity." Borchard,
supra note 13, in 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2.
In Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 269, 274 (1868) (holding that the
United States could not be held liable for the actions of a government agent in forcing
the plaintiff to fulfill a void contract to furnish oats to the military).
Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
o Reynolds, supra note 2, at 81-82. Congress took the first step toward mitigating the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in 1855 when it established the Court of Claims and
thereby consented to contract actions against the United States. W. PROSSER, supra
note 13, at 971.
-, Reynolds, supra note 2, at 81. Before the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
the private bill was the only means by which a citizen could seek compensation for an
injury or loss caused by the tortious act of a government employee. Id
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be liable.22 The waiver of immunity is not complete, however,
because the Act contains numerous exceptions for situations
in which immunity has been retained. 23 By far the most con-
troversial and most litigated of these exceptions is one provid-
ing that the Act shall not apply to a claim "[b]ased upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
di'cretonaryfuncti'on or duty on the part of a federal agency or
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discre-
tion involved be abused. 24
The Act does not define "discretionary function" and, un-
fortunately, the legislative history of the Act has proved to be
of little help in determining the intended scope of the excep-
tion. 25 A relevant discussion of the exception appears in only
one paragraph of the House Report on the Act.26 This para-
graph states that the exception is intended to bar actions for
damages which attempt to test the constitutionality of leglis-
lation or the legality of a rule or regulation.27 The paragraph
also states that the exception does not bar actions against the
government for the common-law torts of employees of both
2 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). This section provides that the district courts:
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, . . for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Id
2 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) lists 13 exceptions to the waiver of tort immunity by the
United States. Besides the discretionary function exception, which is the subject of this
comment, the misrepresentation exception often plays a significant role in aviation
litigation. This exception provides that the Federal Tort Claims Act shall not apply to
any claim arising out of misrepresentation. Id. § 2680(h). See iqfia note 193.
24 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act." Discretion and the Air Trafc Controller, 38 J. AIR L.
& COM. 413, 414-15 (1972).
- H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1945). The paragraph was
adopted from the record of the House Judiciary Committee's hearings on the exception
as it appeared in an earlier version of the Federal Tort Claims Act. See HEARINGS ON
H.R. 5373 & 6463 BEFORE THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 33 (1943). The most complete judicial analysis of the legislative history of the
Federal Tort Claims Act appears in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26-31
(1952).
v' H.R. REP. No. 1287, supra note 26.
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regulatory and nonregulatory agencies.2" In between these
two extremes the paragraph provides guidance only by giving
a few examples of activity that is intended to remain immune
under the exception: the decision to expend federal funds or
execute a federal project would come within the scope of the
exception, 29 as would the discretionary acts of regulatory
agencies. °
Neither the Act nor its legislative history clearly expresses
the policy reasons for excepting discretionary acts from the
general waiver of tort immunity granted by the Act. The lan-
guage of both imply, however, that the purpose of the excep-
tion is to avoid subjecting the government to liability for acts
of a "governmental nature."'3 The recognition of this basis
for the exception is, unfortunately, of little use in defining the
scope of the exception because of the lack of any criteria pro-
vided by which to define "governmental. '32 Beyond the lan-
guage of the exception itself and its scant legislative history,
the lower courts may look to two Supreme Court decisions
33
to aid their efforts in applying the exception.
III. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The major Supreme Court case interpreting the discretion-
ary function exception is Dalehite v. United States . In Dalehile,
the Court examined the liability of the United States for the
explosion of two ships laden with ammonium nitrate ferti-
lizer,' ' which destroyed much of Texas City, Texas.3 6 The fer-
Id.
Id The report states that the exception is intended to prevent a construction of
the Federal Tort Claims Act which would allow an action for damages against the
United States "growing out of an authorized activity, such as a flood control or irriga-
tion project." Id
:- Id. The report gives as an example that the exception is intended to prevent
actions against the Federal Trade Commission or the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission based upon an alleged abuse of discretion. Id.
:, See Dalehitte, 346 U.S. at 32.
:"2 See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955), discussed ih7fa
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
:,, Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15, discussed infia notes 34-50 and accompanying text; Indian
Towing, 350 U.S. 61, discussed infa notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
346 U.S. 15 (1952).
m' Id
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tilizer had been produced according to the specifications of
the federal government and under its control. 7 The plain-
tiffs, those injured by the explosion, claimed that the entire
body of federal officials and employees involved in the pro-
duction of the fertilizer had been negligent 8.3  The Court held
that all of the acts of negligence alleged by the plaintiffs to
have occurred in the production and shipping of the ferilizer
- from the cabinet level decision to institute the fertilizer
program to the Coast Guard's failure to regulate the storage
and loading of the fertilizer - were within the scope of the
discretionary function exception and that the United States
therefore was immune from liability.3 9
In Dalehite the Court did not define the precise limits of the
discretionary function exception but stated that the exception
included "more than the initiation of programs and activi-
ties."'40 The Court stated that the exception also includes "de-
terminations made by executives or administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations ' 4 ,
and that "[w]here there is room for policy judgment and deci-
sion there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of sub-
ordinates in carrying out the operations of government in
accordance with official directions cannot be actionable. '4 2
The Court in Dalehite found that the federal employees in-
volved in the production of the fertilizer were following "a
V Id
'3 Id. at 19-21. The United States planned to export the fertilizer to help meet its
obligation as an occupying power to feed the populations of Germany, Japan and
Korea. Id. at 19. Ammonium nitrate had long been used as a component in explosives
and much of the ammonium nitrate used in the export fertilizer program was pro-
duced in federal munitions plants. Id at 21.
Id at 18.
Id. at 15, 37, 42-43. The Court also found the decision of those in charge of the
fertilizer program not to experiment further with the fertilizer to determine the possi-
bility of explosion, as well as the drafting of the basic plan of production for the ferti-
lizer, to be discretionary functions. Id at 37-40. The Court also held that the Coast
Guard could not be found liable for negligence in fighting the fire caused by the explo-
sion because there was no analagous private liability. Id at 43-44. The Federal Tort
Claims Act provides that the liability of the United States shall be limited to that of "a
private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
- Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 35.
' Id. at 35-36.
- Id at 36.
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plan developed at a high level"'4 3 and that their acts were
therefore within the scope of the discretionary function ex-
ception.44 Although this language and the holding of Dalehite
imply that the Court found all the employees to have acted
"in accordance with official directions, 45 the Court did not
expressly discuss the possibility that some employees may
have acted in contravention of their directions and thereby
contributed to the cause of the explosion.46
Justice Jackson dissented in Dalehite and wrote that only
the initial decision to implement the fertilizer program
should be considered an immune discretionary function, not
the careless deeds of those in charge of detail.4 Jackson
agreed with the majority's views that policy-level decisions
should be within the scope of the exception, but disagreed
with the majority's determination of where policy-making
ended.48 Jackson reasoned that although the official decisions
involved in manufacturing the fertilizer involved "a nice bal-
ancing of various considerations", the balancing was the
same kind that private manufacturers do at their own peril.49
Jackson stated that the scope of the discretionary function ex-
ception should not be stretched to immunize the government
when its officers act without appropriate care for the safety of
others. °
Within three years of Dalehite, the Supreme Court decided
Indian Towtng Co. v. United States,51 which established a "good
Samaritan" basis of liability for the government. Indian Tow-
ing did not directly involve the discretionary function excep-
tion but has been instrumental in aiding lower courts in their
I d. at 40.
I d.
• Id at 36. See supra text accompanying note 42.
But see Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 56 n.lO (indicating that the district court did find
federal employees negligent in carrying out their directions).
4' Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 58.
- Id at 57-58.
19 Id. at 60.
SId.
350 U.S. 61 (1955).
efforts to define its scope. 2 In Indian Towing, those injured
when a barge ran aground alleged that the Coast Guard ac-
ted negligently in failing to repair a lighthouse and failing to
warn the plaintiffs that the lighthouse was inoperative. 3
The government admitted in Indian Towzng that the alleged
acts of negligence were not at the discretionary level but ar-
gued that the maintenance of a lighthouse was a "uniquely
governmental" activity and that under the Federal Tort
Claims Act the government could be found liable only in cir-
cumstances where a private individual could be so found.54
The Court rejected this argument and held that while the
Coast Guard had no duty to undertake lighthouse service,
once it exercised its discretion to do so it was under an obliga-
tion to use due care in its operations.55 The Court stated that
"it is hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the
public of danger and thereby induces reliance must perform
his 'good Samaritan' task in a careful manner.
56
IV. INTERPRETING DALEHITE AND INDIAN TOWING
After the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dalehi'le and
Indian Towing, it is possible for courts faced with determining
5, See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 841 (1967), ditcussed infta note 59.
,,, Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 62.
,4 Id. at 64. The government was attempting to read into the Federal Tort Claims
Act the distinction made in the law of municipal corporations whereby such corpora-
tions are not held liable for tortious acts if they are the result of a governmental func-
tion. Id at 65. The Court referred to the distinction between non-governmental and
governmental activity as a quagmire that the Federal Tort Claims Act did not incorpo-
rate. Id
I d.
r"i Id at 64-65. The "good Samaritan" requirements of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS provide that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324A (1965).
COMMENTS1983]
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the scope of the discretionary function exception to apply it
in several distinct ways.57 First, based on the broad range of
activity found to be discretionary in Dalehiie and the fact that
virtually all acts involve discretion of some kind, a court
could hold almost any act of a government employee to be
discretionary. 58 As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
stated, most conscious acts involve choice and "[u]nless gov-
ernment officials (at no matter what echelon) make their
choices by flipping coins, their acts involve discretion in mak-
ing decisions. ' ' 59 A determination holding that a relatively
routine decision by a government employee was within the
scope of the exception would not be contrary to Dalehie be-
cause the Court in that case found some very low-level, oper-
ational-type activity to be discretionary. 60 A court taking this
approach could distinguish Indian Towing on the basis that
the activity there involved was admitted by the government
to be operational and that the case did not directly deal with
the discretionary function exception. 61 One reason for ap-
plying such a broad definition of discretionary activity would
be to avoid finding the United States liable for activity which
could potentially lead to extensive claims against the govern-
ment. This position echoes the reasoning of Justice Miller
when he stated that the government should be immune from
the torts of its agents to avoid involving the government in
"losses which would be subversive of the public interests.
62
Commentators have suggested that the unstated basis for the
Court's holding in Daleh ie was just such a desire on the part
of the Court to avoid subjecting the government to massive
claims.63
Secondly, a court could take the "good Samaritan" ap-
17 Reynolds, supra note 2, at 103.
"Id.
, Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.) (holding that the FBI's failure
to arrest persons suspected of injuring the plaintiff's business was protected activity
under the discretionary function exception), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967).
- See, e.g., Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 41. The Court found decisions concerning the con-
tents of the fertilizer bag labels and bills of lading to be discretionary. Id
- Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64.
6 Gibbons, 75 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 274. See supra note 18.
- Reynolds, supra note 2, at 97.
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proach of Indian Towing64 and effectively ignore Dalehite.
Under this view, immunity under the discretionary function
exception ends when the government undertakes an activity
which induces reliance. In such a situation, it could be held
that the government has a duty of due care regardless of
whether its acts may somehow be seen as involving planning-
level activity.65 A holding which finds the government liable
on the rationale of Indian Towing for acts which would argua-
bly be within the scope of the discretionary function excep-
tion as defined in Dalehite could be justified on the basis that
Indian Towing is a later case and therefore controlling.6 6 The
policy basis for narrowly defining the breadth of the discre-
tionary function exception in this manner is simply the con-
verse of the rationale for defining the exception broadly: it is
more equitable for the government to bear the loss engen-
dered by the negligence of its agents than to leave the loss on
the plaintiffs, where its effect is likely to be catastrophic. 67
Courts have, for the most part, attempted to steer a middle
course between these two extreme possibilities and apply the
planning-level/operational-level test suggested by the lan-
guage of Daleh/le.68 Under this test, decisions made at the
planning level are immune from liability under the discre-
tionary function exception but decisions made at the opera-
tional level of activity are not immune. 69 The lower courts
seldom choose to articulate what they consider to be the crite-
ria for determining whether activity is at the planning-level
or operational-level.7 ° A rare discussion of the meaning of the
I, Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64-65.
Id
' Reynolds, supra note 2, at 103. See also Smith, 375 F.2d at 246.
67 See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 60 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
- The terms "planning level" and "operational level" to distinguish activity which
is and is not within the scope of the discretionary function exception were used by the
Court in Dalehile, 346 U.S. at 42.
- Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that an FBI
agent's implementing FBI procedures for dealing with highjackers was an operational
activity).
70 See, e.g., Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449, 458 (6th Cir. 1980), dscussed
infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text; Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667, 669
(3d Cir. 1973) (holding that an Air Force decision on where to make flights causing
sonic booms was made at the planning level).
1983]
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terms appears in Swanson v. Unzted States,71 which involved the
negligent design modification of an aircraft by the Air Force.
The District Court for the Northern District of California
found this activity to be at the operational-level and not
within the discretionary function exception.72 The court
stated that the "planning level notion" refers to decisions in-
volving "the evaluation of factors such as the financial, polit-
ical, economic and social effects of a given plan or policy."73
The court defined "operations-level decisions" as those in-
volving "normal day-by-day operations of the
government.
7 4
The planning-level/operational-level test has been criti-
cized as being extremely difficult to apply.75 The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has stated that the test rests on "a
distinction, so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapa-
ble of being held in the mind for adequate formulation. ' 76 In
addition to the definitional problems involved with the plan-
ning-level/operational-level test, courts which choose to ap-
ply the test are also faced with the difficulty of interpreting
how the holding of Indian Towing affects the test. Courts usu-
ally apply the "good Samaritan" rule of Indian Towing only
after they have determined that the activity involved was op-
erational and therefore not within the scope of the discretion-
ary function exception.77
The remainder of this comment analyzes the manner in
which courts have applied the discretionary function excep-
tion in cases where plaintiffs have alleged negligent conduct
on the part of the FAA.
7 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
,2 Id at 221.
," Id at 220.
74 Id; see Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Clains Act. Dtcretionay Function Exception
Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 161, 171-72 (1976). These commentators state that
courts now follow the standards of Swanson and that this leads to predictable results in
cases where the planning-level/ operational-level test is applied. Id at 172-73. But see
Comment, Federal Tort Claims: A Critique of the Planning-Level- Operational-Level Test, 11
U.S.F. L. REV. 170, 172 (1976).
75 See, e.g., Smith, 375 F.2d at 246. But see Harris & Schnepper, supra note 74.
76 Smith, 375 F.2d at 246.
7 See, e.g., Medley v. United States, 543 F. Supp. 1211, 1221-22 (N.D. Cal. 1982),
discussedthfta notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
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V. MISLEADING AERONAUTICAL CHARTS
The Administrator of the FAA is authorized by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958,7" "to arrange for publication of aero-
nautical maps and charts necessary for the safe and efficient
movement of aircraft."7 9 No statutory provision requires the
FAA to publish aeronautical charts or to depict any certain
features on charts that the agency may choose to publish. In
1965, the FAA entered into an agreement with the Depart-
ment of Defense and the Commerce Department to establish
the Inter-Agency Air Cartographic Committee (IACC).8 °
The IACC's purpose is to develop aeronautical chart specifi-
cations and publish aeronautical charts.8 All actions of the
IACC are reviewable by the FAA.82
In Reminga v. United States, " the survivors of a pilot killed
when his aircraft struck the support wires of a television
tower brought an action alleging negligence on the part of
the FAA.84 The plaintiffs claimed the FAA acted negligently
in publishing an aeronautical chart on which the location of
the tower was erroneously portrayed, that the pilot relied on
the chart, and that this reliance was the proximate cause of
the crash.85 The plaintiffs also asserted that the FAA was
negligent in failing to require that the tower be marked with
lights.86
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held for the plaintiffs
and thereby implicitly ruled that the erroneous placement of
the tower on the chart was not protected by the discretionary
function exception.8 7 The Sixth Circuit did not attempt to
analyze whether the decision as to where to place the tower
', 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976)(as amended).
'I Id § 1348(b) (1976).
"' See Baird v. United States, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,476, 17,477 (D. Kan. 1979).
' d This comment examines only the potential liability of the United States for its
chart publishing activity. For a discussion of the liability of private chart publishers,
see McCowen, Liability ofthe Chartmaker, 47 INS. COUNS. J. 359 (1980).
12 Baird, 15 Av. Cas (CCH) at 17,476.
, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980).
' Id at 451.
aI d.
I d at 454.
7 Id. at 452.
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on the chart was one made at the planning level or the opera-
tional level. Instead, the court cited Indian Towing for the
proposition that once the FAA undertook to portray the
tower on its chart it was required to use due care in the task."'
In dicta the court noted that the decision not to mark the
tower as a hazard was discretionary."'
A case similar to Reminga is Allnull v. United Sates,9° which
involved an action brought by the survivors of a pilot killed
when his aircraft struck power lines which were not shown on
a chart published by the IACC. 9' A Missouri district court
held for the United States after determining that a planning-
level decision was made not to attempt to portray obstruc-
tions below an altitude of 200 feet.92 The A//nult court cited
Reminga for its reasoning that the government has a duty to
accurately portray features it attempts to represent on charts
but no duty to portray all possible features. 93
Another case involving a misleading aeronautical chart is
Medley v. United States, 94 in which the United States was de-
nied a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs in Med-
/ey alleged that the FAA was negligent in plotting a
dangerous route over the Sierra Nevada mountains on an
FAA chart.95 Although aware that the selected route was
Id See also Knight v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 316, 324 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
(holding that the FAA had no duty to issue a warning of the location of a tower built
after publication of FAA chart).
-' Remirga, 631 F.2d at 458. See also Columbia Helicopters, Inc. v. United States,
314 F. Supp. 946 (D. Or. 1969) (holding that the FAA was not negligent in failing to
require markings on a 154-foot tower which was visible and on chart). But see United
States v. Washington, 351 F.2d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that the placement of
government owned power lines is a discretionary function but failure to mark the
power lines is operational mismanagement and beyond the scope of the discretionary
function exception).
498 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
Id at 833.
12 Id. at 842. The court wrote that the "traditional inquiry" in determining if an
action is discretionary is the policy/operational dichotomy and that while the cases
give "no clear standards," courts have tended "to examine all relevant factors." Id at
835-36.
- Id at 838.
- 543 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
11 Id at 1214. Medley was a consolidation of three lawsuits involving two separate
aircraft crashes. The plaintiffs alleged that both crashes occurred as a result of the
pilots following a mountain pass route marked on the San Francisco Aeronautical
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hazardous to small aircraft, the FAA did not change the
route or place a warning on the chart. The District Court
for the Northern District of California purported to apply the
planning-level/operational-level test,97 and held that the de-
cision to chart a route through the mountains was made at
the planning level (the FAA does not normally plot routes on
its charts),98 but that the choice of the particular route se-
lected was an operational decision. 99 The court noted that
the FAA has a duty to use due care if it undertakes a good
Samaritan act."0o
While the holding in Medley is easily justified under a good
Samaritan analysis, it is more difficult to justify under the
planning-level/operational-level test on which the court pur-
ports to depend. The court found the FAA decision to plot a
route over a dangerous area in the Sierra Nevada mountains
to be a planning-level decision.'" The policy determination
implicit in such a decision is that the particular portion of the
Sierra Nevadas in question is hazardous to aircraft and that
aid should be given to pilots attempting to cross the moun-
tains at that point. 0 2 The Medley court then found the FAA's
selection of one of several possible routes to plot on its chart
to be operational. 0 3 Each of the routes which could have
been selected by the FAA presumably had distinct advan-
tages and disadvantages. It could be argued that the decision
Chart. The plaintiffs asserted that this route led the pilots into a blind canyon which,




'" Id The court found that FAA officials do not make decisions to place routes on
section charts on a day-to-day basis and that the decision to place the mountain pass
route on the San Francisco chart "was based upon considerations of public safety, after
having been alerted to a natural hazard confronting pilots traversing the Sierra moun-
tains." Id
Id at 1222. The court analogized the choice of routes as similar to acts of design
and construction of government projects, which have been held to be operational acts.
Id
,"' Id. The court also held that having chosen a hazardous route to place on the
chart, the FAA had a duty to warn of the hazard. Id at 1220.
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of which route to place on the chart involved an implicit pol-
icy determination of which of the choices was the safest."°4 In
holding this decision to be operational, the Medley court has
in effect said that the decision that a general area is hazard-
ous involves a policy determination, but the decision that a
particular area is not hazardous does not. 105
Reminga and Medley illustrate the different approaches
which courts take when faced with interpreting the discre-
tionary function exception. In Remiga, the Sixth Circuit ap-
plied the good Samaritan rule without discussion of the
planning-level/operational-level test.10 6 Implicit in this ap-
proach is the concept that the good Samaritan rule operates
independently of the planning-level/operational-level test.
Conversely, in Medley, the court cited and followed the good
Samaritan rule of Indian Towing but only after extensive anal-
ysis of the facts from the standpoint of the planning-
level/operational-level test.'0 7 This approach implies that the
good Samaritan rule applies only if acts are first found to be
operational. Either approach may be inferred from Indian
Towzng. Indian Towing clearly held that where the govern-
ment undertakes to warn of danger, it must proceed with due
care.'O8 The government admitted in Indian Towing, however,
that the negligent acts involved were operational.'0 9 Indian
Towing may therefore be interpreted as holding that the good
Samaritan rule applies without regard to the planning-
level/operational-level test or that it applies only after a deci-
sion is found to be operational.
There can be no assurance which approach a court will
take when faced with a case involving alleged negligence on
the part of the FAA in publishing a misleading aeronautical
chart. Case holdings indicate, however, that either path will
- The plaintiffs in Medley contended that numerous safer routes were available to
pilots. Id at 1216.
,o5 The government in Medley argued that the choice of routes was a discretionary
function. Id. at 1215-16.
Reninga, 631 F.2d at 452.
Medley, 543 F. Supp. at 1218-22.
IndiAn Towing, 305 U.S. 64-65.
Id at 64.
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lead to the same result: the FAA will be found liable if it
provides inaccurate or misleading information in its charts
and this information is found to be the proximate cause of an
accident. Consistent with this view are United States v. Mur-
ray 110 and Sulli'van v. Uni'ted States. "' In both cases the FAA
was held liable for injuries caused when aircraft crashed
while attempting to land on unlighted runways. FAA aero-
nautical charts had wrongly indicated that airport lights were
available." 2 In Sullivan, the District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama found the preparation and circulation of
the chart to be an operational task and applied the good Sa-
maritan rule of Indian Towing." l3 The court did not under-
take any analysis of why the preparation and circulation of
the chart was of an operational character. In Murray, the gov-
ernment did not contend that the acts of negligence involved
were discretionary, and the Tenth Circuit proceeded directly
to the good Samaritan rule. "4
Conversely, if the FAA does not undertake to provide in-
formation, courts will not apply the good Samaritan rule and
will hold in favor of the government. Baird v. United States "'
is a recent illustration of this principle. In Baird, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's find-
ing that, based on IACC specifications, the government had
not undertaken the task of explaining which of several run-
ways at an airport were lighted and therefore could not be
found liable for failing to provide the information on its
chart.'' 6
VI. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS
The Administrator of the FAA is authorized to prescribe
o 463 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1972).
". 299 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ala.), affd, 411 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Fidelity
Bank v. United States, 13 Av. Cas (CCH) 18,356 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding the FAA
liable for injuries caused by pilot reliance on an airport diagram).
"1 Murray, 463 F.2d at 210; Sullivan, 299 F. Supp. at 625.
-1 Sullivan, 299 F. Supp. at 626.
4 Murray, 463 F.2d at 209.
653 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1004 (1982).
Id. at 440-41.
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air traffic rules and regulations for the protection of aircraft,
persons and property." 7 It is under this authority that air
traffic controllers perform the critical function of directing
the takeoff and landing of aircraft. In doing so, controllers
rely primarily on the detailed regulations of the Air Trafic
Control Manual."8 Negligent acts on the part of air traffic
controllers can have severe consequences and have frequently
led to claims against the FAA under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 119
Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co. 120 is the leading case in
determining the extent of FAA liability for the negligent acts
of air traffic controllers. Eastern involved the mid-air collision
of two aircraft which were on final landing approach to
Washington National Airport. 12' The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia found the proximate cause
of the collision to be negligence on the part of an air traffic
controller in clearing both aircraft to land on the same run-
way at the same time and in failing to warn the pilots that
their aircraft were on a collision course.122
The government argued in Eastern that the duties of air
traffic controllers involve discretion and that the discretion-
ary function exception therefore barred any claim against the
United States for injuries and property damage which were a
result of the crash. 23 The court rejected this argument and
held that discretion was exercised when the FAA decided to
operate the control tower but that tower personnel had no
discretion to operate the tower in a negligent manner. 24 The
court reached this conclusion primarily by applying the ra-
, 49 U.S.C. § 1348(c) (1976).
- FAA, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL ORDER 7110.65C (1982).
11 See generallv Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretion and the Air Traftc Control-
ler, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 43 (1972); Annot., 46 A.L.R. FED. 24 (1980).
- 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1957).
'1 Id. at 64. The collision in Eastern involved an Eastern DC-4 airliner being struck
from above and behind by a P-38 military aircraft which had been purchased by the
Bolivian Government and was being piloted by a Bolivian National. The Bolivian
pilot survived the crash. Id
,22 Id at 78.
':1 Id. at 74-75.
',, Id. at 77.
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tionale of Costley v. UnitedStates, 125 a case decided by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals prior to Dalehze and Indian Towing.
Costley held that once the army exercised discretion in admit-
ting a serviceman's wife to a military hospital, it no longer
had any discretion with regard to whether she was to be
treated with due care. 126 This is the same "good Samaritan"
type analysis that the Supreme Court would use in Indian
Towing, which was decided ten months after Eastern. 127 The
court in Eastern also reasoned that the types of decisions made
by controllers do not involve any consideration important to
the practicability of the government's program of controlling
air traffic at public airports and that their actions are there-
fore at the operational level. 128 Dalehite was cited by the
court as the basis of this conclusion. 12 9
The court in Eastern first discussed the FAA's undertaking
to aid aircraft in takeoff and landing as imposing a duty of
due care under a rationale parallel to the good Samaritan
rule of Indian Towing, 130 and second distinguished Dalehite,
which the court stated "neither overruled or impaired" the
rationale of Costy and other similar holdings.' 3 ' The court
compared the finding in Dalehie, that the Coast Guard had
exercised discretion in not regulating the loading of the ferti-
lizer with the initial decision to regulate air traffic control. 132
The court concluded that if the Coast Guard had chosen to
regulate the loading, as the FAA had chosen to regulate air
traffic, it would have been liable for any acts of negligence at
'2 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950). The court in Eastern also cited Somerset Seafood
Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951) and United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d
239 (10th Cir. 1952).
,2 Costley, 181 F.2d at 725.
, Eastern was decided Feb. 8, 1955. Indian Towing was decided Nov. 21, 1955.
"2 Eastern, 221 F.2d at 78.
- Id The court also rejected the government's argument that the case should be
dismissed on the ground that there was no analagous private liability as required for
recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id at 73. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976)
provides that the government may be found liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act
only if a private person would be liable. See supra note 22.
Eastern, 221 F.2d at 75.
Id. at 75-77. See supra note 125.
'3 Id at 77.
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the operational level. 133 This comparison ignored the fact
that while the Coast Guard was not involved in loading the
fertilizer in Dalehite, other government agents were in charge
of bagging the fertilizer and their acts were found by the
Court to be discretionary. 134 Arguably, air traffic controllers
exercise more discretion than the government employees in
charge of bagging fertilizer who were found by the Supreme
Court in Dalehite to be exercising discretionary functions.
135
The government again argued that the acts of air traffic
controllers involve discretion in Ingham v. Eastern Airlines .136
In Ingham, the failure of a controller to report a decrease in
visibility to a pilot was held by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals to be the proximate cause of the crash of the pilot's
aircraft. 137 The court also held that the controller did not
have discretion as to whether to report the weather change
because the Air TraJftc Controllers Manual required that the
change in visibility conditions be reported to the pilot. 138
The court followed the rationale of Eastern and Indian Towing
in holding that once the FAA undertook to establish an air
traffic control system, it was under a duty to operate the sys-
tem with due care. 139 Eastern and Ingham firmly establish that
actions of air traffic controllers are not immune from liability
under the planning-level/operational-level test.14 ° In cases in
which the negligence of controllers is at issue, courts generally
cite one or both holdings and do not attempt to apply the
planning-level/operational-level test.' 4
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 40-41.
See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 104.
373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
,31 Id. at 233.
- Id. (citing FAA, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS MANUAL 265.2 (1979)).
Ingham, 373 F.2d at 238.
See generally Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretion and the Air Trf Controller,
38 J. AIR L. & COM. 413 (1972).
"- See, e.g., Foss v. United States, 623 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1980) (where the court held
the FAA liable for a controller's failure to warn a pilot of a hazardous flight pattern);
Miller v. United States, 522 F. 2d 386 (6th Cir. 1975), discussed infta text accompanying
notes 148-152; Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970), (holding that the
FAA has a duty to report weather changes to pilots); Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d
870 (5th Cir. 1968), discussed infla text accompanying notes 144-147.
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A more difficult issue involving air traffic controllers, in
which the discretionary function exception can sometimes
have an effect, is determining the standard of care by which
to judge the acts of controllers. Ingham has been cited and
followed by courts as establishing the proposition that a con-
troller does not exercise due care if he does not follow FAA
regulations.142 Other authority may be read to imply that a
controller's duty of care may be broader than what is re-
quired by FAA procedures. 4 3 In Hartz v. United States, ' the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the negligent act of
an air traffic controller in failing to warn a light aircraft of jet
turbulence was the proximate cause of the crash of the air-
craft. 1 45 The court held against the FAA and expressly disap-
proved "the view that the duty of an FAA controller is
circumscribed within the narrow limits of an operations man-
ual and nothing more."' 4 6 This statement by the Fifth Cir-
cuit was clearly dicta, however, because the controller's
failure to warn the pilot of the turbulence was in contraven-
tion of FAA regulations.'47
Miller v. United States 1 48 is illustrative of how the discretion-
ary function exception can relate to the issue of the standard
of care required of air traffic controllers. Miller involved the
crash of a commercial airliner during a landing approach at
Greater Cincinnati Airport.'49 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that controllers
were not negligent in providing weather information and as-
,42 See, e.g., Ross v. United States, 640 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
instrument approach manual was advisory and without the force of an FAA regulation
and therefore could not be used to determine a controller's negligence); Miller v.
United States, 522 F.2d at 387.
,4:, See, e.g., Gill, 429 F.2d at 1075 stating that "the government's duty to provide
services with due care to airplane pilots may rest either upon the regulations of proce-
dure manuals spelling out functions of air traffic controllers or upon general pilot reli-
ance." In Gill, however, the lower court finding of liability on the part of the FAA was
reversed on other grounds. Id
144 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
11, Id. at 872.
146 Id. at 873.
147 Id
14a 522 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1975).
149 Id
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signing a runway to the aircraft because their actions com-
plied with FAA procedures. 150 The Sixth Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the FAA should be held liable for
the crash for the failure to promulgate more stringent proce-
dures. 5 ' The court held that the discretionary function ex-
ception precludes the imposition of liability for failure to
impose a more strict set of air safety regulations.
52
One aspect of Dalehite which courts have consistently fol-
lowed is that the decision not to adopt stricter regulations is
within the scope of the discretionary function exception. 153
By following Dalehite in this respect, courts have implicitly
recognized that the promulgation of regulations inherently
involves governmental policy-making activity. Thus, a plain-
tiff faced with a determination that controllers acted in com-
pliance with FAA regulations will almost certainly fail if he
argues that stricter regulations should have been imposed.' 54
Such an argument implies, however, that the standard of care
of controllers is determined by FAA regulations. A better ap-
proach for a plaintiff would be to assert the language of Hartz
which implies that a controller's duty may in some instances
be broader than what is required by FAA procedures.
55
Framing the issue in this manner would avoid a direct con-
frontation with the clearest and least ambiguous application
of the discretionary function exception-the decisions of gov-
ernment officials as to what regulations to impose.
,' Id at 387.
""Id
See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 552 F.2d 370 (10th Cir.), cert. dar'ed,
434 U.S. 835 (1977) (holding that the failure of the government to require more com-
plete fungicide labels was discretionary); Blaber v. United States, 332 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.
1964) (holding that the safety regulation of independent contractors of the Atomic
Energy Commission was discretionary); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that the types of regulations imposed by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration were within the scope of the discretionary function
exception); Fielder v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 77 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that the
FAA's duty to impose hang glider safety regulations was discretionary).
" See supra text accompanying notes 151, 152.
Hartz, 387 F.2d at 873.
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VII. CERTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT
The Administrator of the FAA has a duty to prescribe and
enforce minimum safety standards for the design, production
and maintenance of aircraft and related equipment.'56 This
duty is accomplished through a three-step certification pro-
cess.' 57 The process begins at the design stage of an air-
craft.' 58 FAA aerospace engineers first study design criteria
proposed by a manufacturer. 9 Later, FAA test pilots make
extensive test flights in a prototype of the aircraft.' 6 If the
FAA finds that the design of the aircraft meets its safety stan-
dards, a type certificate is issued. 16'
The manufacturer of an aircraft must next satisfy the FAA
that the aircraft it produces will conform to the prototype. 161
When this is accomplished, the FAA issues a production cer-
tificate. 163 Finally, when the FAA finds that a finished air-
craft conforms to the design criteria of the previously issued
type certificate and is in a safe operating condition, an air-
worthiness certificate is issued.' 64 After an aircraft is in serv-
ice, regular periodic maintenance inspections are required. 165
The FAA also issues certificates authorizing the use of aircraft
in commercial activities.' 66
In recent years, a number of courts have considered
whether a cause of action exists against the FAA if the agency
performs its certification activities in a negligent manner. 167
49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1)(1976).
1d. § 1421(a)(2).
' Id § 1423.
Tomkins, Liabi/ito ofthe United States for Negligent Certifcation of Aircraft, 17 FORUM
569, 570 (1982).
I Id.
49 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (1976).
,62 Tomkins, supra note 159, at 570-7 1.
49 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1976).
I d. § 1423(c).
' Tomkins, supra note 159, at 571.
14 C.F.R. § 298.42 (1975).
The potential for FAA liability for negligent certification of aircraft has been
much commented upon. See generally Dombroff, Certiftation and Inspection: An Overview of
Government Liability, 47 J. AIR L. & COM. 229 (1982); Harrison and Kolezynski, Govern-
ment Liabi'yfor Certification of Aircraft?, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 23 (1978); Hatfield, Nonha-
bih'ty ofthe Government for Certification of Aircraft, 17 FORUM 602 (1982); Iser, It's a Bird, It's
a plane, It's the FAA: Government Liability for Negligent Airworthiness Certifcatzon, 31 HAS-
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The Circuit Courts of Appeals are split on this issue. 168 The
Supreme Court has recently granted writs of certiorari for
two Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cases 169 that hold that
the discretionary function exception does not bar a claim
against the FAA for negligent aircraft certification .70 These
cases, United Scottish Insurance Co. v. United States and VA.R.I G
Airlines v. United States, will be discussed after a review of the
case law that precedes them. 1
In Rapp v. Eastern Airlines, 7 2 decided in 1967, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania clearly held
that a cause of action does exist against the FAA for negligent
aircraft certification, but because Rapp involved an aircraft
which crashed into navigable waters of the United States, the
case was decided under the Suits in Admiralty Act'73 and not
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Suits in Admiralty
Act does not contain exceptions to liability parallel to those
found in the Federal Tort Claims Act. 74 Rapp involved the
crash of a commercial airliner which ingested birds into its
engines on takeoff. The ingestion of the birds caused the air-
craft's engines to lose power, which in turn caused the plane
to crash into Boston Harbor. 75 The aircraft's engines had
been certified by the Civil Aeronautics Board despite the fact
that the Board was aware that the engines would lose power
if they ingested birds. The district court held the government
liable for the crash and ruled that the FAA has a duty to
TINGS L.J. 247 (1979); Tomkins, Lbabiity of the United States for Negligent Certifcatton of
Aircrafi, 17 FORUM 569 (1982); Comment, Federal Tort Clains Act - Government Ltability
for Negligent Safety Inspection ofAircraft, 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 158 (1981).
- Compare Garbarino v. United States, 661 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1981) with
V.A.R.I.G. Airlines v. United States, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S.
Ct. 2084 (1983) and United Scottish Ins. v. United States, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983).
,- V.A.R.I.G. Airlines v. United States, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983); United Scottish Ins. v. United States, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983).
- VA.R.I.G, 692 F.2d at 1208-09; United Scottish, 692 F.2d at 1212.
- See tn/ra notes 201-208 and accompanying text.
-2 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), vacated by agreement, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir.
1975).
,, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1975).
1' See supra note 23.
- Rapp, 264 F. Supp. at 675-76.
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establish the safety of the design of aircraft.' 76 The district
court's decision in Rapp was later vacated by agreement. For
this reason and because the case was not decided under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, courts have not felt compelled to
follow its holding. 77
In Gibbs v. United States,' 8 another early case, a district
court again stated that the FAA has a duty to perform its
inspection and certification activities without negligence. 7 9
This language was dicta, however, because in Gibbs the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee found in
favor of the government after determining that FAA negli-
gence was not the proximate cause of the light aircraft crash
that was the basis of the action. 8 °
The applicability of the discretionary function exception in
cases involving claims against the FAA for the negligent certi-
fication of aircraft was first examined in 1975 in Hoffnan v.
UnitedSla/es."8' Hoffman involved the crash of an aircraft op-
erated by American Aviation, a company issued an Air
Taxi/Commercial Operator (ATCO) certificate by the
FAA.'82 One of the requirements for obtaining an ATCO
certificate is that the operator carry liability insurance.8 3
The FAA issued an ATCO certificate to American Aviation
with knowledge that the company did not carry the requisite
insurance.'84 A prior FAA memorandum had instructed field
personnel not to deny ATCO certificates on the basis of the
,76 Id at 676.
,77 See, e.g., Takacs v. Jump Shack, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,186 (N.D. Ohio 1982). But
see Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973). In Arey, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the lower court's granting of a summary judgment and held that plaintiffs
had stated a cause of action against the FAA for negligently issuing a ferry flight per-
mit. Arney was also decided under the Suits in Admiralty Act and so is not compelling
authority in an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
,78 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
,79 Id at 395.
- Id. See also Bristow v. United States, 309 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1962) (affirming the
dismissal of a plaintiff's claim that the Civil Aeronautics Board allowed an
unairworthy plane to fly on the basis of the lower court's finding that the plane was in
fact airworthy).
is, 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975), afd, 600 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1979).
,.2 Id at 532.
14 C.F.R. § 298.42(a)(1) (1978), cited in H-offman, 398 F. Supp. at 532.
Hioffman, 398 F. Supp. at 532.
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insurance requirement.18 5 The plaintiffs in Hoffman alleged
that the FAA negligently issued the ATCO certificate.18 6
The FAA contended that the decision not to enforce the in-
surance requirement was a descretionary act and that the
government was immune from liability under the discretion-
ary function exception.'87
The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
reasoned that the decision to promulgate the insurance regu-
lation was discretionary but that the FAA had no discretion
to ignore its own regulation. 88 The court applied the plan-
ning-level/operational-level test and determined that the is-
suance of the ATCO certificate was an operational task
because the regulations involved "clear standards to be ap-
plied to fact situations in order to determine basic eligibil-
ity."' 89 The court reasoned that FAA regulations required
insurance of ATCO certificate holders and that no discretion
was involved in determining whether applicants in fact had
insurance.' 90
The lower court dismissed the complaint in Hoffman, how-
ever, because the plaintiffs could not prove that FAA negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the aircraft crash.'' The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on this
basis '  and tersely noted that if it were forced to reach the
"complex legal issues involving the Federal Tort Claims Act"
it would hold the plaintiffs' claim barred by the discretionary
function and misrepresentation exceptions. 193 The court of-
I Id.
111Id
88 Id at 534.




'9 Hoffnan, 600 F.2d at 590.
"I Id at 591. Several lower courts have held that the misrepresentation exception
bars a claim against the FAA for the negligent certification of aircraft. See, e.g., Sum-
mers v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 347 (D. Md. 1979); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
expressly rejected the applicability of the misrepresentation exception in aircraft certi-
fication cases in the companion cases of VA.RIG. and UnitedScottiuh, discussed bifa in
text accompanying notes 201-208. The upcoming Supreme Court opinion on these
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fered no rationale for this determination.
In re Air Disaster Near Silver Plume'94 also involved the crash
of an ATCO certificate holder's aircraft.' 95 The District
Court for the District of Kansas applied the planning-level/
operational-level test, as did the district court in Hofian, but
concluded that the FAA activity involved was discretion-
ary. 196 In Silver Plume, the plaintiffs alleged that the FAA al-
lowed an ATCO certificate holder to operate its aircraft
when the FAA knew or should have known that the holder
was operating in violation of its certificate.' 97 The court
stated that FAA regulations required the FAA to investigate
suspected violations by certificate holders but that the extent
of an investigation and the sanctions imposed were left discre-
tionary under the regulations. 98 The plaintiffs' claim in Silver
Plume was dismissed on this ground and also because the
plaintiffs could not prove that government negligence was the
proximate cause of the air crash involved. 9 9 The court in
cases should effectively settle this issue. See also Block v. Neal, 103 S. Ct. 1089 (1983)
(holding that the misrepresentation exception did not bar a claim against the Farmers
Homes Administration for failing to properly inspect the construction of plaintiff's
home.) The leading Supreme Court case on the misrepresentation exception prior to
Veal was United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961), in which the Court held that
the exception barred a claim by the purchaser of a home who relied upon a negligent
inspection and appraisal by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Courts wish-
ing to do so have found it easy to analogize FHA inspection activities with FAA inspec-
tion activities and hold that the misrepresentation exception applies to both. In
Neustadt, however, the plaintiffs were claiming damages only for financial loss. Most
FAA certificaton cases involve claims of personal injury or property damage. The
Court in Neustadi noted that the scope of the misrepresentation exception was intended
to be limited to the common law tort of misrepresentation, which has been confined
largely to invasions of financial interest. Id. at 711 n.26. This traditional limitation of
the misrepresentation exception to essentially financial matters had led one lower court
to reject the exception as a defense in a negligent certification case prior to the Ninth
Circuit's recent holdings in VA.R.IG and Unit'led Scottish. See In re Silver Plume, 445 F.
Supp. 384, 407 (D. Kan. 1977), discussedinfra in text accompanying notes 194-200. For
one commentator's view of why the misrepresentation exception should apply in negli-
gent certification cases, see Hatfield, Nonhlability of the Government for Certifwiation ofAir-
crafi, 17 FORUM 602, 623-24 (1982).
445 F. Supp. 384 (D. Kan. 1977).
Id. at 388-89.
Id at 402.
,97 Id. at 387.
' Id.
- Id at 410.
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Silver Plume concluded, however, that the FAA has a duty to
perform inspections in a non-negligent manner and that the
breach of this duty may create a cause of action against the
United States.2°
Finally, in United Scottih Insurance Co. v. United States,20 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's find-
ing of liability on the part of the FAA for the negligent in-
spection and certification of an aircraft. United Scottish
involved the crash of an air taxi aircraft caused by a defective
cabin heater.2 °2 The FAA was found to have negligently in-
spected and certified the aircraft after the heating system had
been installed.2 °3 The Ninth Circuit rejected the govern-
ment's contention that liability was barred by the discretion-
ary function exception based on the reasoning that no
policy-type discretion was involved in applying the objective
FAA airworthiness standards to particular aircraft.20 4
The companion case of VA. R. I G. Airnes v. United States 2 0 5
involved the crash of a Boeing 707 near Paris caused by a
lavatory fire.2 6 The FAA had certified the lavatory unit.20 7
- Id. at 409. While Rapp and Gibbs had earlier stated that the FAA has a duty to
perform its certification activities without negligence and the lower court in Hofman
impliedly recognized this, these cases did not discuss the basis of this duty. The court
in Silver Plume, in stating that a cause of action could exist for negligent certification of
an aircraft, followed the reasoning of Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978). In Clemente, the First Circuit reversed a
decision holding the government liable for failing to warn aircraft passengers that the
aircraft which they chartered was overweight and lacked a proper crew.. Id. at 1143.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that a cause of action would have existed if
the plaintiffs had shown that the elements of the good Samaritan doctrine had been
met. Id. at 1145. An important element of this doctrine is reliance on the defendant's
affirmative acts. See supra note 56. Fulfillment of the elements of the good Samaritan
doctrine was the basis of the causes of action in United Scottish and VA.RI.G., discussed
infa in text accompanying notes 201-208.
-' 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2084 (1983). In an earlier
opinion, the Ninth Circuit remanded the lower court's finding of liability on the part
of the United States with instructions that the district court determine if the elements
of the good Samaritan doctrine had been met. United Scottish, 614 F.2d 188, 194 (9th
Cir. 1979). See supra note 56, 200. The opinion here discussed is the Ninth Circuit's
affirmance of the district court's finding for the plaintiffs on remand.
- United Scottish, 692 F.2d at 1210.
o3 Id.
-' Id. at 1212. See supra text accompanying notes 189-190.




In holding that the discretionary function exception did not
bar a claim against the FAA, the Ninth Circuit compared the
duties of FAA inspectors with those of the lighthouse keepers
in Indian Towing .208
Contrary to United Scottish and VA.R.IG. is the holding by
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Garbarino v. Unz'ed
States.2°9 In Garbarino, decided prior to United Scottish and
VA.R.IG, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dis-
missal of a plaintiff's claim for negligent certification of an
aircraft based on the discretionary function exception. 21° Un-
like United Scottish, however, the plaintiffs in Garbarino did not
assert that the FAA was negligent in applying its own regula-
tions. Rather, the plaintiffs asserted that the FAA was negli-
gent in not considering the effect of a potential crash on an
aircraft when it promulgated its certification standards.211
Because the assertion of the plaintiffs in Garbarino that the
FAA should have enacted stricter safety regulations falls into
the area most clearly covered by the discretionary function
exception, 1 2 it can be argued that Garbarino is consistent with
United Scottish and VA.R.I .., where established regulations
were negligently applied. In order for the Sixth Circuit to
reach a decision in accord with United Scottish and VA.R.IG.,
however, it would be forced to retreat from its dicta in Hoff-
man, which involved the failure of the FAA to enforce one of
its established regulations. 3
The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
within the Sixth Circuit, decided Takacs v. Jump Shack Inc. 214
prior to the Ninth Circuit's decisions in United Scottish and
VA.R.G. In Takacs, the survivors of a man killed when his
parachute failed to open brought an action against the FAA
- Id at 1209.
2- 666 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1981).
o Id
" Id at 1063.
2 2 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
21:1 See supra text accompanying notes 192-193.
2,4 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,186 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
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for negligent certification of the parachute. 21 5 The court held
that the claim was barred by the discretionary function ex-
ception.216 The court stated that the decision to certify the
parachute involved "a balancing of a myriad of factors" and
was made at the planning level. 217 This holding is inconsis-
tent with the holding in UnitedScotisfh and VA.R.IG. that the
certification process is operational. 2 8  The court in Takacs
stated that "there are sound policy considerations" for not
extending government liability to certification cases because
to do so would in effect "make the Government the insurer of
all activity which comes under the Government's safety in-
spections. '219  It is arguable that the court's holding was
based more on these policy considerations than on an objec-
tive application of the planning-level/operational-level test.
The uncertain boundaries of the planning-
level/operational-level test have allowed courts to reach dif-
ferent conclusions as to whether FAA certification activity
falls within the scope of the discretionary function excep-
tion. 220 This conflict should be resolved when the Supreme
Court renders its opinion in United Scottish and VA.R.IG.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Indian Towi'ng, the government argued that the United
States should not be held liable for negligently maintaining a
lighthouse because the keeping of a lighthouse is a "uniquely
21 Id at 17,187.
216 Id.
217 Id
21" See supra text accompanying note 201-208.
211 Takacs, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,187. See also Colorado Flying Academy v.
United States, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,362 (D. Colo. 1981). In Colorado Flying Academy,
the district court dismisssed the plaintiffs' claim that the FAA was negligent in certify-
ing a light aircraft design in which a "blindspot" prevented the pilot from seeing an
approaching aircraft. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to show any negligence
on the part of the FAA and that the discretionary function exception would bar the
claim regardless of any such showing. See also Firemen's Fund Ins. v. United States, 527
F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (holding that the discretionary function exception did
not warrant a summary judgment for the United States on a claim of negligent certifi-
cation of a Lear Jet engine design).
2 2 Compare Takacs, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,186 with United Scottish, 692 F.2d 1209.
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governmental" function. 22' The Court rejected this argu-
ment as an attempt to impose on the Federal Tort Claims Act
the law of municipal corporations whereby such corporations
are immune from liability if their acts are governmental in
nature.2 2  The Court referred to the distinction between
"non-governmental" and "governmental" activity as a quag-
mire223 and stated that "[t]here is nothing in the Tort Claims
Act which shows that Congress intended to draw distinctions
so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being
held in the mind for adequate formulation. ' 224 The plan-
ning-level/operational-level test, however, has clearly evolved
into but another murky bog on which sure-footing is impossi-
ble.225 Courts can and do manipulate this test to achieve re-
sults consistent with the policy considerations which they
perceive to be important.2 6
For example, it cannot be said with any rational certainty
that air traffic controllers exercise any more or less discretion
in directing aircraft than do FAA engineers when they ex-
amine a completed aircraft to see if it is built to the same
specifications as its prototype. All courts now agree, however,
that the acts of air traffic controllers are not discretionary 227
while at least some courts have held that FAA certification
activity is discretionary. 228 The dichotomy in the case hold-
ings in these two areas clearly is based not so much on the
acts of the federal employees involved as it is on largely unar-
ticulated policy considerations. On the one hand, courts feel
that the government should be responsible for the acts of air
traffic controllers because pilots and aircraft passengers place
themselves completely at their mercy. 2 9 On the other hand,
some courts believe that to allow recovery against the govern-
ment for certification activity would in effect make the gov-
" Indan Towzhg, 350 U.S. at 64.
222 Id. at 64-65.
,2:1 Id. at 65.
211 Id. at 68.
25 See Smith, 375 F.2d at 246.
'2 See, e.g., Takacs, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,186.
227 See, e.g., Ingham, 373 F.2d at 238.
2 8 See, e.g., Takacs, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,187.
2- See, e. g., Eastern Air Lies, 221 F.2d at 78.
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ernment an insurer and expose it to broad liability.
230
Because of its manipulative nature and its failure to yield
consistent results after over thirty years of application, the
planning-level/operational-level test should be completely
abandoned as a means of determining whether an act is
within the scope of the discretionary function exception. The
scope of the exception should be narrowed so that it extends
only to activity most clearly intended by Congress to be cov-
ered by it. Only decisions to initiate or not to initiate particu-
lar programs, projects, laws or regulations should be held to
be within the scope of the exception.23' If the discretionary
function exception is narrowed in such a manner, two impor-
tant checks remain to prevent the exposure of the govern-
ment to potentially great liability in particular areas.
First, the other exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act
would prevent the most catastrophic claims against the gov-
ernment. For example, the Act does not apply to the combat-
ant activities of the military in time of war2 32 or to any claim
for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treas-
ury.233 Nor does the Act apply in any situation where an em-
ployee of the government has exercised due care in the
execution of a statute or regulation.234
Second, in areas not covered by specific exceptions, a strict
application of the good Samaritan doctrine alone would se-
verely limit many claims against the government. A test
based on the elements of the Good Samaritan doctrine pro-
vided by the Restatement of Torts235 may be stated as
follows:
1. Has the government undertaken an affirmative act?
2. Has the government proceeded with a lack of due care?
3. Has the government's affirmative act caused reliance or
increased the risk of harm to the injured party?
2- See, e.g., Takacs, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,187.
211 See supra text accompanying note 151.
2- 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1976).
2 1 Id. § 2680(i).
234 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
2. See supra note 56.
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The first element of this test begins where the suggested
narrow definition of the discretionary function exception
leaves off. That is, if the government has not undertaken an
affirmative act, the exception should bar any claim against
the United States. The second element of this test requires
that the government act in a negligent manner before liabil-
ity may be imposed. It should here be noted that the
Supreme Court has held that, even independent of the Good
Samaritan doctrine, proof of government negligence is re-
quired in order to assert a claim under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.2 36 This requirement of proof of government neg-
ligence, in conjunction with the requirement of reliance or
increased risk of harm, prevents the United States from be-
coming an absolute insurer in areas such as its certification
activities.
A test similar to the one here suggested is usually applied
by courts only after a finding that the government activity
involved was operational and therefore not within the scope
of the discretionary function exception. 37 It is suggested,
however, that the Good Samaritan test affords sufficient pro-
tection of government resources without the need ever to re-
sort to the planning-level/operational-level test. The
Supreme Court will soon decide whether a cause of action
can be maintained against the FAA for the negligent certifi-
cation of aircraft.238 While this decision could be based on
grounds other than the discretionary function exception, 239 it
is hoped by this commentator that the Court will base its
holding on the exception and in the process forever pave over
the murky bog that is the planning-level/operational-level
test.
Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
2:1 See, e.g., United Scottish, 692 F.2d 1209.
-" See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
2:9 E.g., the Court could reverse VA.R.ZG. and United Scottih by holding that the
misrepresentation exception bars a cause of action against the FAA for negligent certi-
fication activity. See supra note 193.
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